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The rapid orienting of attention to potential threats has been proposed to proceed outside 
of top-down control. However, paradigms that have been used to investigate this have 
struggled to separate the rapid orienting of attention (i.e. capture) from the later 
disengagement of focal attention that may be subject to top-down control. Consequently, 
it remains unclear whether and to what extent orienting to threat is contingent on top-
down goals. The current study manipulated the goal-relevance of threat distractors 
(spiders), whilst a strict top-down attentional set was encouraged by presenting the 
saliently colored target and the threat distracter simultaneously for a limited time. The 
goal-relevance of threatening distractors was manipulated by including a spider amongst 
the possible target stimuli (Experiment 1: spider/cat targets) or excluding it (Experiment 
2: bird/fish targets). Orienting and disengagement were disentangled by cueing attention 
away from or towards the threat prior to its onset. The results indicated that the 
threatening spider distractors elicited rapid orienting of attention when spiders were 
potentially goal-relevant (Experiment 1), but did so much less when they were irrelevant 
to the task goal (Experiment 2). Delayed disengagement from the threat distractors was 
even more strongly contingent on the task goal and occurred only when a spider was a 
possible target. These results highlight the role of top-down goals in attentional orienting 
to and disengagement from threat. 
Keywords: capture, disengagement, threat, top-down goals, response time 
distribution 
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Threat Captures Attention, But Not Automatically: Top-Down Goals Modulate 
Attentional Orienting To Threat Distractors. 
An organism’s odds of survival can be increased by focusing the limited-
capacity processing resources of the visual system on potential threats in the 
environment (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010; West, Anderson, 
& Pratt, 2009). For example, if a visual scene contained both a potentially poisonous 
spider and a harmless butterfly, orienting attention to the spider would facilitate its 
processing, and allow us to take appropriate actions. According to evolutionary models 
of threat processing, such prioritized processing of potential threats is largely stimulus-
driven and reliant on a fast, subcortical pathway that is unaffected by cognitive 
influences such as current task goals or intentions (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka, 
2001).  
One potential issue is that such an encapsulated threat system could conflict with 
the allocation of attention in accordance with an organism’s immediate top-down goals 
and may even endanger survival (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2010). For example, while you are 
driving, reflexively orienting to a spider on your leg and the goal-contingent orienting of 
attention to a traffic light that turns red at exactly the same time, would be at odds with 
each other. Under conditions of stimulus competition (i.e. when multiple stimuli vie for 
attention), current theories of attention propose that orienting is the convergent result of 
goal-driven (i.e. top-down) and stimulus-driven (i.e. bottom-up) processes (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1994). For example, according to the Guided Search model, 
salient stimuli can guide orienting, but be further up- or down-modulated depending on 
their relevance to current top-down goals (Wolfe, 1994). Given that the allocation of 




Worschech, 2010; Awh, Matsukura, & Serences, 2003; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992; Serences et al., 2005; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003), this raises the question 
of whether top-down task-goals can also affect orienting to threat. 
To date, it is not clear whether prioritized orienting to threat is purely automatic, 
as claimed by the evolutionary account, or whether it is susceptible to cognitive 
processes, as would be more in line with current theories of visual search (even though 
such theories do not explicitly model attention to threat). Previous studies may seem to 
suggest that threat stimuli are prioritized for attention (over neutral stimuli) regardless of 
their relevance to the current task goal (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
For example, goal-relevant threat targets (snakes) are detected more rapidly than neutral 
targets (frogs and flowers) in visual search tasks (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, 2011), but 
goal-irrelevant threat distractors (snake, spider) also slow target responses relative to 
neutral distractors (e.g.: butterflies and leaves, Devue, Belopolsky and Theeuwes, 2011; 
lizards and cockroaches, Lipp & Waters, 2007). Furthermore, studies using the dot-
probe task have demonstrated that goal-irrelevant threat distractors that preceded a 
neutral target (irrelevant cue), speed responses when the threat distractor and target are 
presented in the same location and slow responding when presented in a different 
location (Koster, Crombez, & Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Together such results 
have been taken to indicate that threat distractors can compel attention irrespective of 
the current task goals (i.e. when they are goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant).  
An issue in previous studies is that they often struggle to distinguish early 
attentional orienting (i.e. capture) and later processes that commence after the selection 
of a stimulus (i.e. disengagement of focal attention; Yiend, 2010). Very few studies have 
been able to provide evidence in support of rapid orienting to threat (see e.g. Stein, 
Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2014; West, Anderson, & Pratt, 2009). Delays in 
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attentional disengagement have been observed more readily, mainly in studies 
employing the dot-probe paradigm with a neutral baseline (e.g. Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 
2002). For example, Koster and colleagues (2004) showed that the time to locate a 
neutral target (dot) was longer when the target followed in the opposite location from a 
threat distractor (high threat IAPS picture) than when it appeared on a trial with neutral 
distractors (non-threat IAPS pictures). One issue with this approach is that attention is at 
fixation at the beginning of each trial and thus the threat will need to attract attention 
before it can influence disengagement. Belopolsky, Devue, and Theeuwes (2011) 
eliminated such a confound by presenting the (threat)-distractors at fixation and 
requiring an eye-movement to be made away from fixation to a target in the periphery. 
As it is unclear to what extend people engage with a stimulus at fixation, Rudaizky, 
Basanovic, and MacLeod (2014) have furthered this issue by using an exogenous cue to 
direct attention towards or away from the threat distractor and observed evidence for 
both rapid orienting towards and delayed disengagement from threats.  
Disentangling orienting and disengagement is important because both processes 
may differ in their susceptibility to goal-driven modulation (see e.g. Carrasco, 2011). 
For instance, according to LeDoux’ (1996) account, it is plausible that only the initial 
rapid orienting response would be determined by subcortical processes that are 
encapsulated from cognitive top-down control (Low Road; also see Luo et al., 2010). By 
contrast, maintaining or disengaging attention commences at a later stage and could be 
influenced by top-down goals because potential threats are eventually also cognitively 
evaluated in the cortex (High Road; see also Carrasco, 2011, for a similar view). To 
assess this, a paradigm is needed that can both manipulate the locus of attention prior to 
the threat presentation and the goal relevance of a threat (see Vromen, Lipp & 




is imperative to ensure that when the threat distractor appears, attention is allocated 
elsewhere and that the target is not in the distractor location (i.e. the threat will need to 
capture attention to interfere with target responding). In turn, to obtain a clear 
measurement of attentional disengagement it is imperative that attention is already at the 
threat location (thus eliminating the need for attentional orienting), such that the time 
needed to disengage attention from the threat stimulus can be compared to 
disengagement from other, neutral stimuli.  
In a previous study, Vromen, Lipp, and Remington (2015) used a modified 
spatial cueing paradigm to exert tight control over attention and disentangle orienting 
and disengagement (Posner, 1980). The observer’s task was to search for a green animal 
silhouette among 3 grey irrelevant animal silhouettes (distractors). Prior to target 
presentation, attention was controlled by a green pre-cue. Previous studies have shown 
that such a target-matching cue will reliably attract attention even when it is non-
predictive of the target (e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998). The results confirmed that the 
green cue successfully controlled attention, as reflected in significantly faster responses 
on target-cued versus distractor-cued trials. Orienting was assessed on trials where the 
spider was presented at a non-cued location, whereas disengagement was assessed on 
trials where the spider distractor was cued.  
Vromen and colleagues (2015) showed that the goal-irrelevant spider silhouette 
only led to significant disengagement costs when spiders were among the possible target 
stimuli (i.e., potentially goal-relevant), not when the spider was completely task-
irrelevant. Attention was not oriented to the spider silhouette, regardless of its relevance 
to the task-goal. These findings contrast with previous studies that showed large costs by 
task-irrelevant spider stimuli (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Öhman et al., 2012; Ouimet et al., 
2012; Rinck et al., 2005). Such a discrepancy could be due to the fact that the modified 
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spatial cueing paradigm encourages the implementation of a strict top-down target set 
due to the salient target color and brief, simultaneous presentation of target and 
distractor. Alternatively, it is possible that the spider stimulus failed to attract attention 
because the silhouette shapes were not realistic enough to elicit fear or trigger a threat 
response. For instance, Mather and Sutherland (2011) proposed that the effects of high 
priority stimuli (e.g. threat) on attention are amplified by arousal. Similarly, Phelps and 
LeDoux (2005) have proposed that arousal is the key factor that determines the speed of 
processing different stimuli as well as how strongly they are represented (see also Lang 
& Bradley, 2010).  
The aim of the present study was to test whether attention would be oriented to 
more naturalistic threat distractors within the rigorous conditions of the modified spatial 
cueing paradigm. Moreover, to examine to what extent the early covert orienting of 
attention to threat would be modulated by top-down processes, we assessed the effects 
of photorealistic spider distractors on attention when the spider was among the possible 
targets (Experiments 1) versus when it was a completely task-irrelevant distractor 
(Experiment 2). Thus, the current study assessed orienting to and disengagement from 
identical spider distractors with their relevance to the task-goal being manipulated across 
experiments. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate whether prioritized orienting 
to and delayed disengagement from threatening photorealistic spider distractors (as 
compared to non-threatening cat distractors) was evident when both were goal-relevant 
(i.e. part of the target-set). The observer’s task was to identify the green target singleton 
as a spider or cat, while ignoring the three grey-scale distractors (a bird, a fish, and a 




distractors, while on the other half of the trials a grey-scale cat distractor was present 
(see Figure 1 for an example of the stimulus displays). To assess whether the spider 
pictures were indeed perceived as more threatening than the other animal pictures, the 
photorealistic animal pictures were rated in terms of their fearfulness and arousal. 
Moreover, to ensure generalizability of the results, the participant population was 
assessed in terms of their spider fear with the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; 
Klorman, Hastings, Weerts, Melamed, & Lang, 1974). 
Prior to presenting the target display, attention was cued to one of the four 
potential stimulus locations by a target-colored cue (four green dots), so that the spider 
or cat distractor was initially attended on some trials (disengagement trials) and 
unattended on others (orienting trials; see Figure 1). The effectiveness of the green cue 
in controlling attention was confirmed by faster target identification on trials on which 
the cue had been presented at the target location compared to trials where the cue had 
been presented elsewhere (see Figure 3). Pre-cueing of a threatening spider or a non-
threatening cat distractor allowed measuring disengagement, as attention did not have to 
be oriented to the stimulus anymore, only to be disengaged and re-oriented to the target. 
Pre-cueing a different stimulus (e.g., neutral distractor or target) allowed measuring 
whether attention would be oriented to the threatening spider and non-threatening cat 
distractor, as they would need to capture attention in order to interfere with target 
identification. Based on the previous study by Vromen et al. (2015), threatening spider 
distractors would be expected to hold attention over and above non-threatening cat 
distractors. Due to the increased threat or arousal value of the photorealistic spider 
stimuli we also hypothesized that attention would be oriented more readily to 
threatening spider distracters than non-threatening cat distractors. 
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Figure 1. The procedure for the spatial cueing task (diagonally from bottom left to top right) 
showing an example of a foil-cued trial with a spider distractor from Experiment 1. The two cueing 
displays at the top left exemplify a target- and distractor-cued trial respectively. The foil-cued trials 
allowed examining delayed disengagement from the spider distractor (RT cued spider distractor – RT 
cued cat distractor), whereas target- and distractor-cued trials allowed examining orienting to the spider 
distractor (RT non-cued spider distractor – RT non-cued cat distractor). 
Method 
Participants.  
Twenty-four students from the University of Queensland, Australia (14 women; 
M = 19.29 years, SD = 3.42 years) participated in the experiment for course credit. One 
subject was excluded because of a 100% error rate in one condition.  
Participants’ total SPQ score ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of 9.27 (SD = 
6.63). This is indicative of a wide range of non-clinical spider fear, with non-fearful 
samples’ total SPQ score usually being centered around 4 and arachnophobic samples’ 





Stimulus presentation was controlled by DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003) 
running on a Dell Optiplex 780 computer. Stimuli were presented on with a 19-in. color 
monitor with a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels, and a refresh rate of 85Hz. Responses 
were collected through the left and right shift keys on a QWERTY keyboard.  
Materials. 
Spatial Cueing Task. The fixation display consisted of a central fixation cross 
and four placeholder boxes (see Figure 1). Placeholders (2.9°x2.5°) were positioned in a 
cross-like configuration equidistantly from the central fixation cross (5.7° from the 
nearest corner). The cueing display consisted of the fixation display with the addition of 
a spatial cue that consisted of a set of four green squares (CIE luv values = 80, -71, 92), 
each measuring (0.5°x0.5°). The target display consisted of the fixation display with the 
addition of four animal pictures presented within each of the 4 placeholders. All target 
displays contained a spider, cat, bird, and fish, whereby either the spider or cat were 
presented in green (target), and the bird and fish were always presented in grey (non-
targets). 
In total 24 photorealistic animal pictures were used, consisting of 6 spider, cat, 
bird, and fish pictures each. They were drawn from previous experiments conducted in 
the Emotion, Learning, and Psychophysiology Laboratory at The University of 
Queensland, from the Internet, and from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). The original picture backgrounds were 
replaced by a uniform white background and the animals were equated in size (Mpixels = 
2011) and average grey value (MCIEluv values = 54,0,0). The 12 animal target pictures used 
in Experiment 1 were created by transforming the color balance of each spider and cat 
picture so that bright green-scale images were created (MCIEluv values = 80, -71, 92). A 
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pilot-test with  20 participants was conducted to confirm that spider and cat targets do 
not differ in time to be identified in a set-up where they were presented among three 
neutral animals, bird, fish, and horse non-targets, and in the absence of a cat or spider 
distractor ). The results of a paired t-test comparing trials with the spider versus cat 
target revealed no significant difference in target identification time (t(20) = 1.411, p = 
.174). 
Rating Task. To assess whether spider pictures were indeed more threatening 
than cat, bird and fish pictures, respectively, animal fear ratings for were collected for all 
stimuli using a visual analogue scale (VAS; 170mm long) labelled with “Not at all 
fearful” on the left-hand side to “Very fearful” on the right-hand side, with no 
intermediate labels. Picture fear and arousal ratings for each animal category were also 
collected, with the VAS ranging from “Not at all scary” to “Very scary” for the former 
and from “Not at all arousing” to “Very arousing” for the latter.   
As shown in Figure 2, spider pictures had higher fear-ratings (M  = 94.02, SD = 
46.45) than cats, birds, and fish pictures (cats: M = 27.68, SD = 36.76, t(21) = 7.343, p < 
.001; birds:  M = 42.00, SD = 42.39, t(21) = 4.058, p = .001; fish: M = 28.64, SD = 
36.68, t(21) = 7.178, p < .001), whereas the others did not differ in terms of their fear 
ratings (cats-birds: t(21) = 1.436, p = .166; cats-fish: t(21) = .125, p = .902; birds-fish: 
t(21) = 1.259, p < .222). The results showed that spider and cat pictures had higher 
arousal-ratings (spider: M = 55.64, SD = 46.05; cat: M = 44.05, SD = 44.05) than bird 
and fish pictures (birds: M = 26.57, SD = 27.04; fish: M = 28.07, SD = 29.97; spider vs. 
bird: t(21) = 2.909, p = .008; spider vs. fish: t(21) = 2.895, p = .009; cat vs. bird: t(21) = 
2.370, p = .027; cat vs. fish: t(21) = 2.124, p = .046). Arousal ratings for spider and cat 
pictures did not differ from one another (t(21) = 1.104, p = .282) nor did arousal ratings 





Figure 2. Mean fear and arousal ratings (and standard errors of the means) for the spider, cat, bird, and 
fish pictures in Experiment 1 (panel A) and Experiment 2 (panel B). In both experiments, spiders were 
rated as scarier than cats, birds, and fish. In Experiment 1, spiders and cats were rated as equally arousing 
and as more arousing than birds and fish. In Experiment 2 fish were rated as less arousing than cats, while 
no other differences in arousal were observed. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
Design.  
The experiment consisted of the 3 × 2 within subjects conditions Cued Picture 
[target-, distractor-, foil-cued] and Distractor Identity [spider, cat]. Contingent on which 
picture was displayed in the cued placeholder, three trial types can be distinguished: 
target-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the green cue was presented at the location of 
the green target picture (spider or cat); distractor-cued trials (50%; 144 trials), in which 
the cue was presented at the location of a grey-scale picture with a non-target identity 
(bird or fish); and foil-cued trials (25%; 72 trials), where the cue was presented at the 
location of the grey distractor with a target identity (spider or cat). On half of the foil 
trials the distractor was a spider, and on the other half a cat.  
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Each picture was displayed equally often and each animal category was 
displayed equally often in each of the four placeholders. Each participant completed 12 
practice trials and 288 test trials. Trial presentation order was randomized for each 
participant and allocation of target animal to response key was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Procedure.  
All participants first completed a spatial cueing task that consisted of a practice 
phase and a test phase. Immediately afterwards they completed the pen-and-paper 
version of the SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) as well as the animal and picture VASs.  
Spatial cueing task. At the start of the spatial cueing task participants were 
informed that each target display would contain four animal pictures (a spider, cat, bird, 
and fish). They were instructed to identify, as quickly and accurately as possible, 
whether the single green picture on each trial depicted a spider or a cat by pressing the 
left or right shift keys. Participants were told to try to ignore all grey-scale pictures and 
the green cue presented prior to the target display, as these stimuli were all irrelevant to 
their task.  
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation display (882 ms) which 
was followed immediately by the cue display (82 ms; see Figure 1). After the cue 
display, the fixation display was presented again (82 ms), followed by the target display 
(47 ms). The target display was followed by a white screen (882 ms). The next trial then 
started again with the presentation of the fixation display. Accuracy feedback was only 






 Reaction times from incorrect responses and extreme scores, defined as values 
more than three standard deviations above or below each participant’s mean reaction 
time, were excluded from the analyses leading to a loss of 10% of all data. 
Green Cue.  
First, to assess whether the color cue directed attention, mean RT on target- and 
non-target- (distractor- and foil-) cued trials were assessed. The one-way ANOVA 
showed a significant effect of Cued Picture [target, distractor, foil] on target 
identification time, F(2,22) = 70.499, p < .001, partial η2 = .865 (see Figure 3). Follow-
up paired t-tests showed faster target identification on target-cued trials than on 
distractor-cued trials (by 83 ms, t(23) = 11.613, p < .001) and foil-cued trials (by 96 ms, 
t(23) = 10.897, p < .001), and slower target identification on foil-cued trials compared to 
distractor-cued trials (by 13 ms, t(23) = 2.221, p = .037). 
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Figure 3. Mean target identification time (and standard error from the means) on target-, distractor-, and 
foil-cued trials in Experiment 1 (averaged over spider and cat distractor trials). Target identification is 
faster on target-cued trials than on distractor- and foil-cued trials. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
Orienting.  
To assess attentional orienting to spider distractors, we employed two paired t-
tests to compare target identification time on trials with a non-cued spider versus cat 
distractor. The first paired t-test showed that on distractor-cued trials, the spider slowed 
target identification by 52 ms more than the cat distractor, t(23) = 4.691, p < .001 (see 
Figure 4, panel A). The second paired t-test showed that even on target-cued trials where 
attention was already allocated to the target, the spider distractor slowed target 
identification, by 47 ms, compared with the cat-distractor, t(23) = 3.559, p < .05. Error 
rates did not differ between trials with a spider or cat distractor, neither on distractor-






Figure 4. Panel A. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the means) on distractor- and 
target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor in Experiment 1. Panel B. Mean target identification 
time (and standard errors of the means) on foil-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor in Experiment 
1. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
 
 Disengagement.  
To assess whether spider distractors delayed disengagement, we used a paired t-
test to compare target identification time on trials with a cued spider versus a cued cat 
distractor. Cueing the spider distractor slowed target identification on average by 72 ms 
compared to cueing of the cat distractor, t(23) = 5.253, p < .001 (see Figure 4, panel B). 
The mean errors showed the same results, with significantly more errors when the spider 
distractor had been cued (M = 21.64, SD = 18.24) compared to when the cat distractor 
had been cued (M = 15.39, SD = 19.40; t(23) = 3.250, p = .004). We also conducted a t-
test to compare target identification time on trials were the spider distractor was cued 
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(foil trials; 728 ms) or non-cued (distractor trials; 702 ms). Cueing the spider distractor 
slowed target identification by 26 ms compared to presenting the spider distractor in a 
non-cued location, t(23) = 3.086, p = .005. The same t-test for cat distractor trials (650 
ms versus 656 ms) showed no such difference, t(23) = 1.013, p = .321. 
Discussion 
The current experiment shows rapid orienting to photorealistic spider distractors 
in the modified cueing paradigm with a spider and cat target set. Rapid orienting to the 
threat distractor was observed even when attention was already at the target location and 
thus there was no need to shift attention. The experiment also shows evidence for 
delayed disengagement from the goal-relevant spider distractors when they were 
presented in a cued location. The current findings contrast with a previous study by 
Vromen and colleagues (2015), which showed that simplistic threat silhouettes delayed 
disengagement when they were goal-relevant, but did not capture attention, and suggests 
that the pre-attentive orienting to and the subsequent disengagement of attention from 
the same threat may be differentially susceptible to stimulus characteristics. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that spider distractors can both capture attention and delay 
disengagement when the current target-set includes spiders. To assess whether the rapid 
orienting of attention to spider distractors is contingent on top-down attentional control, 
Experiment 2 assessed orienting to the same spiders when they were not relevant to the 
top-down target-set (bird and fish targets). Previous studies have shown that spider 
distractors can bias attention even when they are completely irrelevant to the current 
task-goal, which has been interpreted as evidence for the evolutionary hypothesis that 
attentional orienting is not subject to top-down modulation. If this hypothesis holds in 




disengagement and 2) encourages the adoption of a strict top-down set, then Experiment 
2 should yield the same results as Experiment 1. However, a previous study has 
provided evidence that disengagement from threat can be affected by top-down 
modulation (Vromen, Lipp, & Remington, 2015). If orienting to threat is also contingent 
on top-down control, then we would expect Experiment 2 to show evidence for reduced 
attentional orienting to spider distractors. As in Experiment 1, if attention is oriented 
preferentially to spider distractors then non-cued spider distractors should interfere with 
target responses, while delayed disengagement should manifest in prolonged RTs with 
spider distractors are cued. 
Method 
Participants.  
Twenty-five students from the University of Queensland, Australia (13 women; 
M = 18.17 years, SD = 3.84) participated in the experiment for course credit. Participants 
total SPQ score ranged from 0 to 21, with a mean of 8.36 (SD = 5.09; Klorman et al., 
1974). The SPQ scores in Experiment 2 did not differ from those in Experiment 1, as 
assessed by an independent-samples t-test: t(45) = .533, p = .597. 
Apparatus.  
The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
Materials.  
The materials were identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions.  
Spatial Cueing Task. The targets in Experiment 2 were either a green fish or a 
green bird (identical to the grey-scale bird and fish pictures except in color; never a 
spider or cat). Each target display consisted of a green bird or fish (target), grey bird or 
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fish (foil), spider or cat, and a horse (distractors). Six horse pictures were added to the 
overall stimulus set. 
Rating Task. Similar to experiment 1, spider pictures had higher fear ratings (M 
= 88.13, SD = 55.35) than cat, bird, and fish pictures (cats: M = 16.00, SD = 20.52, t(23) 
= 6.116, p < .001; birds: M = 19.13, SD = 24.88, t(23) = 6.284, p < .001; fish: M = 
20.79, SD = 35.79, t(23) = 6.676, p < .001; see Figure 2, right panel). Arousal ratings 
were comparable for all pictures (spiders: M = 48.12, SD = 48.81; fish: M = 27.00, SD = 
35.21; all ts < 1.4), except for cats (M = 43.88, SD = 47.90) being rated as more 
arousing than fish (M = 27.00, SD = 35.21; t(21) = 2.118, p = .045). 
Design.  
The design was identical to experiment 1, with 4 stimuli displayed on each trial. 
The following changes were implemented. On each trial a bird, fish (one as the target, 
one as a target-similar distractor), either spider or cat (as target-dissimilar distractors), 
and a horse distractor were presented. To compare cat and spider distractor trials when 
both were irrelevant to the task, the targets in Experiment 2 were a green bird or a green 
fish (never a cat or spider). When the target was a bird, the fish was included in the 
display as the foil, and when the target was a fish, the bird acted as the foil. Moreover, 
each display contained a single irrelevant spider or cat distractor. As we wanted to keep 
the number of stimuli within a display identical to Experiment 1 (4 items), we added a 
neutral horse distractor to each display. Thus, each display contained a green target 
(bird/fish), foil distractor (fish/bird), irrelevant threatening or non-threatening distractor 
(spider/cat), and a neutral distractor (horse). With this, the conditions and displays in 
Experiment 2 were maximally similar to those used in Experiment 1, with all changes 
relating to the necessity of presenting the spider and cat distractors in separate displays 




disengagement were measured by comparing trials with a spider vs. cat distractor when 
they were not pre-cued and cued (by the green cue), respectively. Thus, four different 
trial types can be distinguished: (1) target-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the green 
cue was presented at the location of the green target (green-scale bird or fish); (2) 
spider/cat distractor-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the cue was presented at the 
location of the spider or cat distractor; (3) horse distractor-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) 
where the cue was presented at the location of a grey-scale horse picture, and (4) foil-
cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the cue was presented at the location of a grey-scale 
target-similar distractor (bird or fish). 
Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. The only difference was that 
participants were instructed to identify whether the single green picture on each trial 
depicted a bird or a fish (rather than a spider or cat as in Experiment 1). 
Results 
Green cue.  
Fifteen percent of all data was lost due to errors and extreme scores. The one-
way ANOVA showed a significant effect of Cued Picture [target-, horse distractor-, 
spider/cat distractor-, and foil-cued] on target identification time, F(3,22) = 48.246, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .868 (see Figure 5). Paired t-tests showed that target identification was 
faster on target-cued trials than on distractor-cued trials (spider/cat cued: 101 ms, t(24) = 
12.192, p < .001; horse cued: 98 ms, t(24) = 12.123, p < .001) and foil-cued trials (103 
ms, t(24) = 10.935, p < .001), indicating that the color cue directed attention. There was 
no difference between the other trial types (horse-cued trials vs. spider/cat-cued: 3 ms, 
t(24) = .905, p = .374; spider/cat-cued vs. foil-cued: 2 ms, t(24) = .347, p = .732; horse-
cued vs. foil-cued: 5 ms, t(24) = .839, p = .410). 
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Figure 5. Mean target identification time (and standard error of the means) for target-, horse 
distractor-, spider/cat distractor-, and foil-cued trials in Experiment 2 (averaged over spider and cat 
distractor trials). Target identification is faster on target-cued trials than on both the distractor-cued trials 
and the foil-cued trials. ** = p < .001,. 
Orienting. 
To assess whether the spider distractors captured attention, we conducted three 
paired t-tests to compare spider and cat distractor trials when the cue had been presented 
in a location other than that of the spider or cat (see Figure 6, panel A). When the cue 
had been presented at the location of the horse (horse cued trial), target identification 
was 18 ms slower with a spider distractor than with a cat distractor (t(24) = 2.227, p = 
.036). When the cue had been presented at the location of the foil (fish or bird), there 
were no differences between spider and cat distractor trials, t <1. Similarly, on target-
cued trials, when the cue directed attention directly to the green target, there were no 




for the mean error rates were in the same direction, with more errors on spider than cat 
distractor trials only observed on horse-cued trials, t(24) = 3.079, p = .005), and no 
differences on foil-cued trials, t(24) = 1.270, p = .994, or target-cued trials, t(24) = .175, 
p = .863. 
 
Figure 6. Panel A. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the means) on horse 
distractor-, foil-, and target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor in Experiment 2. Panel B. Mean 
target identification time (and standard errors of the means) on spider/cat distractor-cued trials in 
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Disengagement.  
To assess delayed disengagement, a paired t-test compared target identification 
time on spider-cued trials with cat-cued trials. The results showed no difference between 
the two (t(24) = .971, p = .341; see Figure 6, panel B). Similarly, the mean error rates 
showed no difference between spider and cat-cued trials (t(24) = .984, p = .335).  
Orienting and disengagement compared across experiments.  
 A direct comparison of the overall spider orienting scores (RT non-cued spider 
distractor trials minus RT non-cued cat distractor trials) between Experiments 1 (M = 49 
ms) and 2 (M = 4 ms) with an independent samples t-test confirmed that orienting to 
spiders was significantly reduced in Experiment 2, t(46) = 3.731, p = .001. A direct 
comparison of the overall spider disengagement scores (RT cued spider distractor trials 
minus RT cued cat distractor trials) between Experiments 1 (M = 73 ms) and 2 (M = 12 
ms) with an independent samples t-test confirmed that spider disengagement was also 
significantly reduced in Experiment 2, t(46) = 3.308, p = .002. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 showed that orienting to spider distractors was much 
reduced when spiders were not included in the target-set. The spider distractor only 
attracted attention when attention had initially been misdirected to an entirely task-
irrelevant stimulus, but not when the target or target-similar distractor (foil) had been 
cued. Thus even when the spider was task-irrelevant it still had the ability to capture 
attention, but only when the initially attended (cued) stimulus did not contain any task-
relevant features (non-target identity and color). These findings indicate that threatening 
spider stimuli did only capture attention away from task-relevant stimuli (foil, target; 
Experiment 1) when included in the target set (i.e., potentially task-relevant), which 




modulated by goal-driven processes. A second important finding of the current study 
was that delayed disengagement from the threat was eliminated when spiders were not 
included in the target-set. Of note, deviating from previous studies, capture by the spider 
was not necessary to observe delayed disengagement, as attention was directed to the 
spider by the green cue.  
General Discussion 
The present study provides evidence that top-down processes modulate both 
attentional orienting and attentional disengagement when these processes are 
manipulated and measured independently from each other. The study also demonstrates 
that a task-relevant spider distractor can attract attention even when the locus of 
attention is tightly controlled. This contrasts with the findings of Vromen et al. (2015) 
where a potentially task-relevant spider silhouette did not attract attention. 
Consequently, rapid orienting to threat may require a richness in stimulus features that is 
observed only in more naturalistic stimuli. More naturalistic images are likely also 
evaluated as being more threatening or arousing. Support for perceived threat value, 
rather than arousal value, was observed in the current study as spider images were rated 
as more threatening, but not more arousing, than control stimuli (see Figure 2; see e.g. 
Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; though a strong test of the arousal 
hypothesis may require a psychophysiological measurement of arousal).  
Still, it should be noted that the present study cannot rule out that the effects of 
the threatening spider were due to its salient perceptual features (e.g. its long legs). 
Previous studies have shown that attention can be automatically attracted to salient 
features that are embedded in complex stimuli (such as visible teeth in angry faces; e.g. 
Becker, Horstmann, & Remington, 2011; Horstmann & Becker, 2008; Horstmann, Lipp, 
& Becker, 2012). However, these findings do not necessarily contradict the evolutionary 
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view, as certain feature detectors (e.g., for the detection of spiders) could have evolved 
because they were relevant for survival, thus rendering the visual system more sensitive 
to these features (e.g., Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). Moreover, the conclusion that the 
implied threat value plays a role in driving attention seems to be the most parsimonious 
explanation for the differences observed between spider silhouettes vs. more naturalistic 
spider stimuli (Vromen et al., 2015); specifically, the finding that only the more 
naturalistic spider attracted attention when they were completely task-irrelevant. 
Of most interest to our research question, we observed that orienting to spider 
distractors was modulated by top-down goals such that orienting was strong when a 
spider was amongst the possible targets (i.e. potentially goal-relevant; Experiment 1), 
but much reduced when it was completely goal-irrelevant (Experiment 2). Specifically, 
when the spider was potentially goal-relevant, it attracted attention even when attention 
was pre-cued to the target and obviated the need for further search. By contrast, when 
the spider was goal-irrelevant and attention was cued to a target or foil, the spider 
distractor failed to attract attention. Only when attention had been pre-cued to another 
task-irrelevant and target-dissimilar distractor did the photorealistic spider attract 
attention. The results show that spider distractors have an ability to attract attention even 
when they are completely task-irrelevant.  
This finding is in line with previous studies that have demonstrated evidence for 
rapid orienting to (simplistic) task-irrelevant threat (see e.g. Carlson & Reinke, 2008). 
However, previous studies differ from the present study in that (1) the target was often 
not singled out by a salient perceptual feature (e.g., green colour) that would allow 
effective top-down tuning of attention to the target; (2) the target was often presented 
until the response, which contrasts with the data-limited displays used in the present 




study (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Rinck et 
al., 2005; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2014). The modified cueing paradigm as employed in the current study may be less 
likely than previously employed paradigms to show orienting to goal-irrelevant threats 
due to the conditions encouraging a strong top-down bias to the target feature(s). Hence, 
the finding that task-irrelevant photorealistic spiders could still attract attention shows 
that threatening stimuli can attract attention quite strongly – viz., against an effective 
top-down set for completely different stimuli (i.e., green bird and fish targets) and 
despite the fact that data-limited displays require allocating attention swiftly to the 
target. That said, the theoretically more important finding is perhaps that orienting to 
threat was still modulated by top-down control (see comparison between Experiment 1 
and 2). This shows that orienting to threat is not encapsulated from top-down control 
(LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), but instead requires a model that takes both 
the (subjective) threat value of stimuli and their task relevance into account, and allows 
top-down modulation of threatening stimuli (e.g., competitive interaction model; e.g., 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; see also e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Pessoa & 
Adolphs, 2010). 
The current results also demonstrate top-down modulation of attentional 
disengagement, with a spider distractor delaying disengagement only when it was 
potentially goal-relevant (Experiment 1). Both orienting and disengagement have to be 
due to distractor-related effects and cannot be due to target-related effects since a pilot 
study without spider and cat distractors showed that the identification speed was 
comparable for spider and cat targets. The observed top-down modulation of both 
orienting and disengagement may call into question a strict distinction between early and 
late attentional processes, as has, for instance, been proposed by Carrasco (2011). 
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Instead it may indicate that both are largely determined by the same, cognitively 
penetrable mechanisms (see also Becker, 2011). However, this conclusion is certainly 
speculative and would require further research. 
Potential alternative accounts 
Our conclusion that the differences in orienting and disengagement between 
Experiments 1 and 2 were due to top-down influences could still be subject to two 
possible objections. First, it should be noted that if participants in Experiment 2 were 
generally less fearful of spiders, this could provide an alternative explanation for 
reduced attentional orienting to threat. Second, the mean target identification time in 
Experiment 2 (M = 718 ms) was longer than in Experiment 1 (M = 663 ms). One might 
argue that slower target identification could be correlated with reduced spider 
interference, if the process that is needed to override attention to spider distractors is an 
active, effortful process that takes time to implement (e.g., filtering; see Folk & 
Remington, 1998). If this was the case, spider interference would be expected to be 
more pronounced on trials with relatively faster RTs and less pronounced on trials with 
slower RTs within each of the experiments.  
To assess whether attentional orienting was affected by spider fear, we first re-
analysed the data from Experiments 1 and 2 separately for the relatively more and less 
spider fearful participants. Second, to probe whether prioritized attention to spider 
distractors and its top-down control differed over the response time distribution, we 
assessed orienting and disengagement separately for each decile of the RT distribution. 
Effects of self-reported spider fear.  
Orienting. To assess whether prioritized orienting to spider distractors was 
contingent on spider fear we carried out a median split analysis based on participants’ 




1, an independent samples t-test showed that the orienting difference scores (RT non-
cued spider distractor minus RT non-cued cat distractor) did not differ between the 
relatively more and less spider fearful group, neither on distractor-cued trials, t(22) = 
.282, p = .695, nor target-cued trials, t(22) = 1.513, p = .145. The same comparisons for 
the overall error rates showed no difference either between the relatively more and less 
fearful groups (distractor-cued: t(22) = .295, p = .771; target-cued: t(22) = .851, p = 
.404). 
In a similar vein, no differences in orienting were observed between the 
relatively more and less spider fearful groups in Experiment 2. Target identification time 
was comparable for the relatively more and less fearful groups on horse distractor-cued 
trials: t(23) = .759, p = .456, and target-cued trials: t(23) = 1.225, p = .233). The overall 
difference between the relatively more and less fearful groups was significant (in the 
hypothesized direction) on foil-cued trials, t(23) = 2.691, p = .013, but follow-up t-tests 
showed that neither group showed a delay in target identification that differed 
significantly from zero (higher fear: t(12) = 1.795, p = .098; lower fear: t(11) = 2.027, p 
= .068). No differences in error rates were observed either between the groups (horse 
distractor-cued trials: t(23) = 1.728, p = .097; foil-cued trials: t(23) = .982, p = .336; 
target-cued trials: t(23) = 1.635, p = .116).  
Disengagement. To assess whether attentional disengagement was contingent on 
spider fear, we compared the disengagement score (RT cued spider distractor minus RT 
cued cat distractor) for the relatively more and less spider fearful groups with another 
independent samples t-test. No differences in disengagement were observed between the 
relatively more and less spider fearful groups (Experiment 1: t(22) = .609, p = .549; 
Experiment 2: t(23) = .814, p = .424). No differences in error rates were observed either 
(Experiment 1: t(22) = .445, p = .661; Experiment 2: t(23) = 1.562, p = .132).  
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In sum, there were no differences in the mean SPQ score between experiments or 
in the behavioural results between the relatively more and less spider fearful groups 
within both experiments. Combined, these results render it unlikely that the reduction in 
orienting to and rapid disengagement from spiders in Experiment 2 can be attributed to 
spider fear.  
Results from the Response Time Distributions.  
To assess whether the longer RTs in Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 1 
could account for reduced attention to threat, we assessed orienting and disengagement 
separately for faster and slower responses. Specifically, we assessed these effects within 
each decile of the RT distributions. 
Orienting. To test whether prioritized attentional orienting to the non-cued 
spider distractors in Experiment 1 was observed across all points of the RT distribution, 
we binned distractor- and target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor based on 
RT (see e.g. Leber, Lechak, & Tower-Ricardi, 2013; Figure 7). The first decile (.1) 
contains the fastest 10% of response times, the second decile (.2) the second fastest 10% 
of response times, etc. Paired t-tests comparing target identification time for spider and 
cat distractor trials showed that, for the distractor-cued trials (Figure 7, first panel), the 
spider distractor slowed target identification more than the cat distractor in all deciles, 
with the smallest t-value observed in the first decile (all t(23) > 2.612, all p < .017). For 
the target-cued trials (second panel), the spider distractor significantly slowed target 
identification in each of the deciles, except the last decile (t(23) = 1.270, p = .217; all 
other p < 0.018). 
The same analyses conducted for Experiment 2, showed that on horse distractor-
cued trials (Figure 8, first panel) the spider distractor slowed target identification in the 




3.057, p = .005; .7: t(24) = 3.135, p = .004), whereas it failed to do so in both the earlier 
and later deciles (all t(24) < 1.979, all p > .150). For the foil-cued trials (Figure 8, 
second panel), the spider distractor slowed target identification in the 4th and 5th deciles 
(.4: t(24) = 2.629, p < .05; .5: t(24) = 2.060, p < .05), but not in any of the other deciles 
(all t(24) < 1.686, all p > .104). For the validly-cued trials (Figure 8, third panel) the 
spider distractor did not delay target identification in any decile (all t(24) < 1.527, all p > 
.140). 
 
Figure 7. Mean target identification time for spider and cat trials for each RT 
decile in Experiment 1, with the first panel showing distractor-cued trials and the second 
panel showing target-cued trials. 
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Figure 8. Mean target identification time for spider and cat trials for each RT 
decile in Experiment 2, with the first panel showing horse distractor-cued trials, the 
second panel showing foil-cued trials, and the third panel showing target-cued trials. 
 
Disengagement. The RT distribution analysis for Experiment 1 showed that the 
spider distractor delayed target identification more than the cat distractor in all 10 
deciles, with the smallest t-value observed in the fourth decile (all t(23) > 3.520, all p < 
.003; Figure 9). Conversely, for Experiment 2, the spider distractor did not slow target 
identification more than the cat distractor in any of the RT deciles (all t < 1.863, all p > 
.074; see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 9. Mean target identification time for spider and cat cued trials for each 






Figure 10. Mean target identification time for spider and cat cued trials for each 
RT decile in Experiment 2. 
 
The RT distribution analyses show that the difference in result between 
experiments cannot be attributed to overall RTs being longer in Experiment 2. Rather, 
when spiders were task-relevant (Experiment 1), rapid orienting and delayed 
disengagement were observed over the entire RT distribution, indicating spider 
interference to be robust and not disproportionally driven by trials with especially fast or 
slow responses. When spiders were task-irrelevant (Experiment 2), orienting and 
disengagement were not more pronounced on trials with shorter RTs. The RT 
distribution analysis revealed some residual orienting to spiders in intermediate deciles 
when attention had been initially deployed to a target-(dis)similar distractor, but not 
when attention had been cued to the green target. These results are consistent with a 
model in which attention to threat is modulated by top-down mechanisms that boost 
target-similar but not target-dissimilar stimuli (or perhaps even down-modulates the 
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latter. See e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; see also e.g. Duncan & Desimone, 1995; 
Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).  
The RT distributions also indicated that disengagement was perhaps more 
strongly modulated by goal-driven processes (i.e. no residual disengagement delays 
from the spider distractor in any RT decile). The present results essentially indicate that, 
when a tight top-down set is encouraged, attentional disengagement depends only on 
whether the selected stimulus is similar to the target, regardless of the threat potential of 
a stimulus. These results are in line with the view that disengagement is entirely under 
the command of top-down goals, possibly, because the perceptual analysis of selected 
stimuli can be limited to only task-relevant aspects and features (with identification 
initially proceeding on a ‘need to know’-basis for the purpose of distractor rejection; 
e.g., Becker, 2011; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007).  
The finding that individual spider fear did not modulate orienting or 
disengagement is at odds with previous studies showing, for instance, delayed 
disengagement in participants who are highly fearful of threat-related stimuli (e.g., in the 
dot probe task; Fox et al., 2001). Whereas the current study showed no modulation of 
threat interference or top-down control by spider fear, it is of note that we tested a non-
phobic sample and that the median is a rather arbitrary divide. Thus, the present results 
should not be taken to mean that subjective fear cannot modulate orienting or 
disengagement. Further research is needed to investigate how top-down modulation of 
threat interference is affected in individuals with high (clinical) levels of spider fear, and 
whether fear could affect top-down modulation of attentional orienting and 





In summary, the current study indicates that attentional orienting to threat may 
only be observed when nothing more relevant to one’s current goals is vying for 
attention. These findings provide a new perspective on the research domain of attention 
to threat by indicating that even the early orienting of attention to threat is contingent on 
current top-down goals, suggesting early orienting to threat to be more complex and 
cognitively involved than previously hypothesized. 
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